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Abstract 
This study examines the corporate annual reports of three leading UK legacy newspaper 
publishers (Guardian Media Group, Daily Mail and General Trust, and Trinity Mirror) across 
fifteen financial years from 2002. It tracks how the publishers reshaped their corporate 
frameworks and business and product portfolios in responding to market, consumer and 
technological shifts in the digital era. In particular, the study addresses the implications of 
digital and market upheavals for the corporations’ traditional roles as custodians of and 
operational contexts to journalism’s values paradigm. It evaluates the extent to which the 
corporations sought to protect news’s commodity value and journalism’s public interest 
norms within their digital transition strategies, which became increasing sites of managerial 
focus and resource allocations from the mid-2000s. 
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Introduction 
Print media has run as a continuous line across the history of mechanised and mass media 
since the printing press’s development in the mid-1400s. Its publishing lineage, through 
books, periodicals, newspapers and magazines, represents one of the longest product life-
cycles “of any manufacturing industry” (Picard 2011, 32). Tied to print media’s historical 
resilience as a traded commodity has been its profound role in the circulation, preservation 
and advancement of human knowledge and creativity. 
In recent decades, broad patterns of print media decline have accelerated as audience 
engagement has veered towards digital platforms. Change is a persistent theme in the mass 
media’s development, as new commercial opportunities, professional practices and audience 
habits have formed around emergent technologies. Recurrent, also, is the experience of print 
media’s traditional functions being challenged by newer media forms, including film and 
broadcasting. But the ramifications of recent shifts are particularly significant, given the 
longevity of print media and the unprecedented pace and uncertain implications of changes 
associated with digital media. 
Newspaper publishers, especially, have wilted in the shadow of digital’s growth, with 
consequences both for their own commercial viability and for their wider societal 
contribution. From, circa, the late-1800s, British and American newspaper industry structures 
developed in a manner which supported the production of news as a for-profit informational 
commodity while also sustaining journalistic practices, norms and ethics aligned to notions of 
serving the public interest. This arrangement has supplied the scaffolding for the dominant 
corporate (commercial production) frameworks and values (public interest) paradigm of 
Western print journalism for more than a century (Nerone 2013; Chalaby 1996). The 
normative ideal of their symbiosis often has been diluted in reality, when profit motives or 
proprietors’ agendas have been pursued at the expense of journalistic quality or impartiality. 
But despite their tensions, the intertwining of corporate frameworks and the values paradigm 
has offered a reliable means of resourcing for-profit news production and of hosting a 
“consensus” on ethical organisational and professional journalistic behaviours (Ward 2014, 
455). 
Extending the arrangement to digital media has proven difficult. Newspaper 
publishers are finding that the characteristics of digital capitalism are unfavourable to 
resourcing journalism and extracting a profit from news content. An acute pressure point has 
been the proliferation of publishing opportunities online, which has eroded the distribution 
barriers that shielded the commodity value and commercial sustainability of print news 
production in older models of mass communication. Associated with an online fragmentation 
of both producers and consumers of news has been a “breakdown in consensus” on what 
constitutes journalism and what are the values and ethics that ought to inform appropriate 
professional practices (Ward 2014, 461). 
Focusing on the United Kingdom (UK), this research evaluates the restructuring of 
corporate frameworks as print publishers revised their product portfolios, business models, 
resource allocations, production processes and distribution strategies to sustain the 
commodity value of news in the digital era. Underpinning the study is an analysis of the 
corporate annual reports of three leading legacy publishers: Daily Mail and General Trust 
(DMGT), Guardian Media Group (GMG), and Trinity Mirror. The timeframe, 2002-2016, 
captures the historically pivotal years when the publishers began tying their corporate futures 
to digital. The research examines how the publishers communicated the decline of their print 
assets to shareholders, while seeking to reassure them about the growth potential of digital 
activities. Furthermore, it examines the extent to which the publishers’ digital transition 
strategies attempted to balance commercial and journalistic imperatives. 
 
Emergence of print journalism’s corporate frameworks and values 
paradigm 
 
The trading of printed materials through the late-1400s and 1500s reflected the efforts of 
early printers to exploit the commercial potential of a new communications technology 
(Briggs and Burke 2005; Conboy 2004). Such activities, for some 150 years before 
newspapers emerged, revealed a key economic characteristic of print: texts could generate a 
profit if they were sold at an appropriate price to a sufficiently large audience. As the 
newspaper trade developed and strengthened in the 1600s, printers recognised another 
opportunity for income: audience attention, commodified through advertising. By the mid-
1600s, London newspapers were publishing an average of six advertisements (Briggs and 
Burke 2005). Already, in rudimentary form, the core business model had emerged that would 
underpin the industrialisation of newspaper publishing and would sustain the practice of a 
professionalised journalism to modern times: a dual-market of selling news to audiences and 
selling audiences to advertisers (Doyle 2013a; Baker 2007). 
Progressively through the 1700s and 1800s, publishers consolidated the structures and 
practices of a maturing industry, including: sophisticated production processes housed within 
complex organisations (companies); regular publishing schedules; systematic distribution 
networks; formalised routines for information gathering; and specialisation of labour for 
reporting, editing, typesetting and printing (Chapman 2005). A consequence of newspaper 
industrialisation was increasing costs of production and distribution, which amplified the 
commercial imperatives for publishers to reach wider (mass) audiences beyond narrow 
political and elite groups (Conboy 2004). Higher start-up and operational costs raised the 
capital barriers to new entrants, which favoured monopoly or oligopoly trading conditions for 
incumbent publishers and nurtured industry tendencies towards concentration of tit le 
ownership. Large publishers gained gatekeeper control over access to audiences which 
strengthened their economic value as disseminators of news and advertising (Nerone 2012; 
Meyer 2009). 
Increasingly complex and resource-dependent production would be sustainable in 
commercial terms only if publishers could form and maintain a deep enough market of 
readers and advertisers. The late-1800s and early-1900s was a crucial period in elevating 
newspapers to a mass media form, with universal education, rising literacy rates and growing 
levels of disposable income extending the potential market of readers (McNair 2003). 
Helping to broaden newspapers’ appeal was a push by news-workers for journalism to be 
recognised as a profession, which would be subject to appropriate ethical values and practices 
to gain the public’s trust (Tandoc and Oh 2017). Core to the normative values paradigm that 
emerged from the professionalisation of journalism was the notion of serving the public 
interest (Chalaby 1996).  
The ‘public interest’ being served rarely was defined in a precise manner. 
Nevertheless, it formed the spine of a professional discourse which, philosophically, 
positioned journalism as holding powerful political, economic, social and cultural actors to 
account, as a watchdog on the state, and as a means to maintain informed citizenries and 
stimulate democratic debate (Hess 2017; Nerone 2012). Journalism’s self-anointed roles 
reflected that its values paradigm weaved in Liberal traditions which prized freedom of 
expression, resistance to authoritarianism, and independence from the state (Chalaby 1996). 
Professionalism enabled journalists to project to their audiences a duty to “publish 
responsibly” above serving proprietors’ profit motives (Ward 2014, 457). 
Such a professional culture was allowed to develop within for-profit companies 
because proprietors and managers recognised that it reinforced the legitimacy of newspapers 
as disseminators of newsworthy information (Tandoc and Oh 2017). Publishers that offered 
‘independent’ journalism would accrue market benefits through their titles’ increased 
audience appeal and advertiser attractiveness (Chalaby 1996). Furthermore, the values 
paradigm recognised journalism’s positive externalities: that beyond the immediate 
commercial transaction between a seller (publisher) and a buyer (audience) of news, 
journalism’s public interest function provided wider societal benefits that were crucial to a 
healthy democracy (McChesney 2013; Baker 2007). In particular, journalism’s positive 
externalities supported fair and “effective governance and the rule of law” while also seeking 
to protect individual freedoms and promote social justice (McChesney and Pickard 2011, ix).  
Political economists of the media alongside proponents of the propaganda model have 
long questioned the ideological foundations, socio-economic biases, audience 
commodification and editorial autonomy of for-profit journalism in the corporate news media 
system (Bagdikian 2004; Herman and Chomsky 2002; Mosco 2009). Notwithstanding 
concerns about the marketisation news, the alignment of corporate frameworks and the values 
paradigm has underpinned a broadly coherent ethical and normative approach to public 
interest journalism which, in the digital era, is distorting with unknown implications (Nerone 
2012; Ward 2014). Moreover, while public interest journalism may have emerged within a 
market-based system, its positive externalities are so important to society as to be 
independent of the market (McChesney 2013). In other words, democratic societies require 
public interest journalism even if the market can no longer sustain its production.  
Recent digital upheavals have exposed even more keenly that the market-based 
system has never fully compensated legacy newspaper publishers for journalism’s positive 
externalities: as citizens, subscribers and non-subscribers alike benefit if journalism’s 
watchdog role helps, for instance, to reduce governmental corruption (Baker 2007). Although 
news organisations may gain additional subscribers through their reputation for journalistic 
excellence, the societal value of deepening editorial investment will never truly be realisable 
(or justifiable) in commercial terms, meaning that, on purely market criteria, legacy 
newspaper publishers carry “an inadequate profit-based incentive” to produce resource-
intensive public interest journalism (Baker 2007, 30).  
 
Corporatisation of newspaper publishers 
 
Corporatisation, conglomeration and internationalisation became striking features of 
newspaper ownership from the mid-twentieth century. Leading such processes were 
American publishers in the 1960s, when privately owned newspaper chains floated as public 
corporations to gain capital for further expansion (Soloski 2015; Meyer 2009). Even then, 
Wall Street viewed newspaper publishing as a “mature” industry under audience and 
advertiser pressure from “disrupting technologies” such as television (Meyer 2009, 15). 
In earnings terms, however, newspaper publishing was still regarded as a growth 
industry: first, in real-terms, print was benefitting from the overall increase in the advertising 
market even if newspapers were claiming a smaller percentage of it; second, publishers 
implemented deep cost cutting and adopted more efficient production technologies to protect 
profits; third, titles raised cover and advertising prices in monopoly and oligopoly markets 
(Meyer 2009). Even as circulations declined in subsequent decades, investors were primed to 
expect steady-state revenues to support share prices, fund dividends and service debts (Meyer 
2009; Soloski 2015). The cost cutting efficiencies that managements implemented to protect 
short-term profitability and shareholder value often came at the expense of journalism’s 
positive externalities, e.g., a reduction in the editorial resources available for investigative 
journalism (Baker 2007). 
Despite being structurally different to its American counterpart (which had crystalised 
mainly around city and regional titles), the UK newspaper industry underwent a similar 
transformation from the late-1960s when international and cross-media corporations began to 
take over national titles (Conboy 2004). In some cases, prominent mastheads were reduced to 
“tiny outposts of vast, highly profitable multinationals” (Keeble 2007, 1). Furthermore, the 
boards of publicly traded corporations were obliged legally to act in the best interests not of 
audiences but of shareholders. In such operational contexts, management behaviours 
prioritised near-term “bottom line” objectives above “the quality of journalism” or longer-
term issues of sustainability (Soloski 2013, 310). 
With increasing urgency from the 1990s, corporations chased scale and scope 
economies through acquisitive growth to protect operational profits in declining print 
markets. The investments reflected, also, a management mentality that publishers needed to 
be “big to survive” (Sjovaag 2014, 513). Accordingly, US publishers The Tribune Company 
and McClatchy embarked on a flurry of expensive takeovers in the early- to mid-2000s 
(Soloski 2015), as did, in the UK, Johnston Press. 
Soon after, when the global financial crisis hit, the earnings capacity of corporations’ 
existing and newly acquired newspapers shrivelled: US print advertising revenues more than 
halved between 2006 and 2011 (Soloski 2015), with UK publishers reporting steep income 
declines from 2007 (Figure 1). Publishers were still liable for loans that had funded 
acquisitions, but were left servicing debt off smaller revenue bases and were carrying 
mastheads whose asset value had evaporated. While many publishers remained operationally 
profitable during and after the financial crisis, they traded on margins that were too low to 
pay down debt while also funding significant digital investment (Brock 2013). Cost-cutting 
and editorial redundancies became the standard industry response to withered revenues, while 
print product innovation focused on “processes for efficiency improvements” (Krumsvik 
2012b, 123). Such managerial actions often safeguarded news’s commodity value in 
quarterly and annual returns, but damaged its social good value (Meyer 2009; Duffy et al. 
2017). They also represented a continuation of the rigid managerial approaches that had 
developed in the more stable pre-Web media environment to support short-term profits 
(Soloski 2013; Meyer 2009). Adherence to trusted managerial logics may be among the 
reasons why publishers were “not nimble enough” in reconfiguring their businesses for the 
less predictable digital age (Soloski 2015, 49-50). 
 
Print to digital transitions 
 
Historically, newspaper publishers have been successful in appropriating new production and 
distribution technologies to enhance news output and profitability. In seeking digital 
opportunities, legacy publishers have become multi-platform producers and distributors 
across electronic editions, websites, apps, and social media (Doyle 2013a). 
However, publishers’ capacity to service digital platforms at a commercially 
sustainable level remains unproven (Sjøvaag 2016). Preserving scarcity ranks foremost 
among the difficulties they face online. Traditional publishing frameworks protected the 
value of print as a news and advertising medium through maintaining gatekeeper distribution 
structures, which narrowed the scope for audiences and advertisers to avail of substitute 
media products. Online, the wider availability of substitutes has weakened publishers’ hold 
on audiences and undercut their relationships with advertisers (Krumsvik 2012a). 
The online substitutes drawing audiences and advertisers away often are doing so with 
content that originated with legacy publishers. Social media platforms have become networks 
for news distribution, soaking up advertising revenues but without carrying the costs and 
responsibilities of producing news and employing journalists (McChesney 2013; Cole and 
Harcup 2010). Social media’s success has illustrated the commercial impact on legacy 
publishers of diminished control over distribution. Newspaper publishers have embraced 
social media as platforms to promote their newsbrands and content. However, online 
audiences habitually consume news content within third-party social media apps, without 
visiting a publisher’s own platforms. A platform’s capacity to generate revenues through 
digital advertising depends, crucially, on maintaining high volumes of active users 
(McChesney 2013). Engagement patterns in which users consume news content but remain 
within third-party social media environments deflate a legacy publishers’ digital advertising 
returns. But the legacy publisher still bears the costs of content production.  
Revenue generation difficulties persist even when online audiences are consuming 
news content on a legacy publisher’s own platforms. Audiences generate detailed usage and 
preference data on digital platforms, which provides opportunities for newsrooms to tailor 
content offerings. However, translating online audience data into significant commercial 
benefits has proven difficult for news publishers (Doyle 2015). More broadly, for about 
twenty years, legacy publishers have been wavering between paywall and free-access 
advertising models (or combinations and variations thereof) to generate digital revenues. 
Decades of experiments have produced “no settled result” on models that provide a 
sustainable basis for funding commercial journalism (Brock 2013, 151; Arrese 2016). The 
elusiveness of a sustainable model may reflect a core weakness in advertising-funded 
approaches: much of the advertising that appears on news platforms is channelled through 
third-party ad networks, which retain up to 50% of the fees generated (McChesney 2013). 
Third-party ad networks enable advertisers to target specified demographics wherever they 
are online, and accord no privilege to news platforms as advertising outlets. Google’s display 
ads network, for instance, is integrated into more than two million websites and 650,000 
apps, and promises advertisers that, across devices, “your ad can show up wherever your 
audience is" (Google 2017). That legacy publishers embed third-party ad networks into their 
platforms suggests that, online, they have lost a key competitive advantage: being 
gatekeepers between advertisers and their desired demographics. 
Since the financial crisis, publishers increasingly have targeted digital revenues to 
compensate for shrinking print income and reignite revenue growth. However, the digital 
platforms on which publishers are building their transition strategies continue to be weaker 
revenue generators than print (Brock 2013). While scrambling for digital sustainability, 
legacy publishers must still direct considerable resources to managing profitable declines of 
their print operations. Digital transitions, therefore, are occurring in operational contexts that 
anchor publishers to long-standing print managerial logics and behaviours. This is reflected 
in corporate discourse which insists that the heritage and trust embedded in newspaper 
mastheads ultimately will secure a digital future, even though the evidence for this is fragile 
(Cole and Harcup 2010). Similarly, the industry “consensus” holds that “future revenues are 
to be found online”, despite balance sheets continuing to identify print as publishers’ main 
revenue generator (Sjovaag 2014, 513). Along these lines, Krumsvik (2012a, 729) argues that 
legacy publishers will continue to depend on “revenues from strong traditional media 
products” to fund journalism because competitive forces online are stacked against the 
development of sustainable business models for news production.  
 
Corporate portfolios  
 
Under corporate ownership, newspapers tend to be published as part of a portfolio of 
businesses and products. Such portfolios can take many forms: be cross-media or single 
sector; address different segments of a media sector (national/regional newspapers); comprise 
closely connected media products (a print newspaper and associated digital platforms); entail 
a mix of media and non-media businesses; and span regional, national or international 
markets (Picard 2005). 
Media corporations develop portfolios for a number of reasons: to manage product 
life-cycles (seeking long-term sustainability through balancing mature/declining products 
with emergent/growth products), increase market share, expand revenue generation and profit 
opportunities, spread risk across diversified products, gain competitive advantages through 
scale, reflect technological changes, or respond to competitor and consumer behaviours 
(Picard 2005; Krumsvik 2012b). 
 Media portfolios tend to be fluid, as corporations increase or decrease investment in 
certain activities, discontinue or launch products, divest unprofitable operations, develop new 
business areas, and engage in horizontal or vertical integration (Picard 2005). Portfolio shifts 
affect resource allocations across a corporation, and require high degrees of organisational 
learning through the management of new organisational structures, technological systems, 
production processes and employee skill-sets (Doyle 2013b: Picard 2005; Duffy et al. 2017). 
Such adjustments mean that the position of a particular media business or product is not fixed 
within a corporation’s portfolio. A previously core activity may be downgraded if its revenue 
generation capacity falters in light of new market conditions. 
 In reshaping their portfolios, legacy publishers have employed newspaper mastheads 
as a “base brand” (Picard 2005, 14) to establish a market identity for online news platforms. 
By doing so, publishers have engaged in portfolio resource transference: (declining) print 
revenues often have supported digital investments, including at times when print operations 
have been subject to budget cuts. Reconfiguring a media portfolio obliges managements to 
justify their resource allocation decisions through developing diversified revenue streams and 
increasing returns from the newly supported products and business areas (Doyle 2013b). For 
corporations with newspaper businesses, a key challenge has been to extend the operationally 
profitable life of print while raising the returns from digital products to a commercially 
sustainable level. 
 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Across fifteen financial years, the corporate annual reports provided rich insights to the 
publishers’ strategic, organisational and commercial transformations. For public limited 
corporations, annual reports carry statutory and regulatory obligations to publish core 
financial results and to review factors affecting operational performances. Therefore, annual 
reports tend to be embedded with discourse through which directors seek to explain, defend 
and justify their decision-making to shareholders (Breeze 2012). Discursively, corporate 
annual reports tend to be aimed at (and should be read as texts constructed for) specialist 
audiences of shareholders, analysts, investors and regulators. 
The researcher implemented a qualitative content analysis on the annual reports to 
track key financial indicators and to capture the discursive frames through which print 
declines and digital transitions were communicated to shareholders. Qualitative content 
analysis enables researchers to examine, interpret and present significant volumes of nuanced 
qualitative material (such as operational review narratives) in a systematic manner through 
establishing, for coding purposes, frames of discursive meaning (Schreier 2012). As the 
reports were lengthy and complex documents, the researcher adopted a grounded theory 
“open coding” approach to develop an appropriate coding framework (Gray 2009, 502). 
Rather than imposing pre-defined criteria, the researcher detected key financial and 
discursive coding frames through the process of analysing the reports. Identifying discursive 
frames enabled the researcher to map the resilience, decline or emergence of managerial 
behaviours and perspectives as well as corporate priorities and strategies across the fifteen 
year timeline. The presence or absence of discursive frames were visualised as Instance 
Charts (Kirk 2016) in Figures 1-4. 
The publishers’ annual reports adopted standard structures and were embedded with 
similar elements (including directors’ statements, key financial indicators), which facilitated 
comparative analysis. The findings were arranged into three thematically coherent headings 
for analysis: Principal Activities and Revenues, Print Operations, Digital Operations. 
A limitation on the research was the “transparency and consistency” with which 
media corporations report financial information (Doyle 2013b, 5). Corporations have some 
flexibility on what they include and divulge under different financial headings and accounting 
standards. Furthermore, the businesses being reported under a financial heading may change 
year-on-year following disposals, acquisitions or restructuring, or income types may be 
reclassified. This can create difficulties when seeking to make like-for-like comparisons 
between media corporations, or when evaluating a single corporation’s performance across 
financial years. As a case in point, the publishers were inconsistent year-to-year with 
separating digital from print income. Figure 1 notes when inconsistencies affected financial 
data comparisons. 
 
 
 
 
Findings 
 
Publisher overviews 
 
The three publishers, through their flagship newspapers, offered three distinctive 
interpretations of public interest journalism: the Guardian (GMG) was liberal; the Daily Mail 
(DMGT) was conservative; the Daily Mirror (Trinity Mirror) was left-leaning.  
The publishers also followed three distinctive portfolio strategies in adjusting to the 
digital era. In the early-1990s, DMGT committed to developing a diversified, international 
portfolio, less reliant on the UK newspaper market. By the mid-2000s, DMGT was attributing 
more than half of its revenues to non-news information and business-to-business service 
sectors. The corporation sold its regional newspaper division in 2012. 
 GMG’s sole shareholder, the Scott Trust, was established to protect the Guardian’s 
journalism in perpetuity. To 2008, GMG was developing a portfolio of non-news businesses 
to generate profits to support the Guardian. In the following years, GMG sold its portfolio of 
non-news businesses as well as its regional newspaper division. The proceeds were funnelled 
into an investment fund to augment the Guardian’s financial resources. 
 Trinity Mirror’s portfolio comprised national and local newspapers, from which it 
sought scale and scope efficiencies. From 2010, the corporation amplified a long-standing 
strategy of acquisitive growth for its local newspaper portfolio, gaining ownership of titles 
previously held by GMG and DMGT. In the mid-2000s, Trinity Mirror increased investment 
in digital platforms to complement its print products.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal activities and revenues 
 
 
 
In the early-2000s, each corporation identified its principal business activity as print 
publishing. Only Trinity Mirror did so in 2016, despite positioning itself the previous year as 
a “multimedia content publisher” (Trinity Mirror 2015, 1). DMGT, in 2008, was the first of 
the publishers to lead with a non-print business in its portfolio. In 2002, GMG acknowledged 
its increasing activities online through the Guardian Unlimited website, but added that the 
organisation remained “at heart a newspaper Trust” (GMG 2002, 8). A decade later, GMG 
formally adopted a digital first policy, prioritising the publication of Guardian journalism 
online. 
The publishers displayed similar patterns of group revenue performance: relatively 
stable or increasing revenue returns to the mid-2000s, with sharp declines thereafter. Income 
from non-news businesses was strongest in DMGT’s diversified portfolio, making the 
corporation least dependent on print revenues by 2016. As a result, DMGT experienced the 
smallest drop from its revenue high point, in 2008, to its low point, in 2013: £2,312m to 
£1,802m, a 22% decline. Trinity Mirror’s high-low decline, from £1,142m in 2004 to £593m 
in 2015, was 48%. GMG’s retrenchment, from £752m in 2005 to £206m in 2013, was 73%. 
GMG’s dramatic revenue drop resulted, in part, from the sale of non-news businesses. 
But a steep fall-off emerged, also, in core print revenues (circulation and advertising). 
Gaining a clear view of each publishers’ year-on-year print revenues was difficult. In some 
years, the publishers separated out the print advertising and circulation revenues generated in 
their newspaper divisions. In other years, they reported an overall divisional figure, 
comprising also income from non-news and digital businesses. Nevertheless, the publishers 
displayed similar print revenue patterns: peaking in or before 2008, with steep deteriorations 
thereafter. GMG’s print (divisional) revenue high-point, in 2008, was £382m. By 2016, print 
revenues stood at £128m. Some of the print income loss stemmed from GMG’s sale of its 
regional publishing division in 2010. After this transaction, with GMG’s publishing narrowed 
to The Guardian and The Observer, print revenues continued to slide. 
In 2007, with print revenues of £1,217m, DMGT proclaimed that “the cash flow that 
our newspapers generate is prodigious” (2007, 2). By 2016, print revenues had declined to 
£706m.  Like GMG, DMGT’s print revenues continued to fade following the sale of its 
regional publishing division in 2012. 
Trinity Mirror maintained a narrower portfolio than DMGT and GMG, and was more 
reliant on print revenues, which peaked in 2004 at £970m. By 2015, print returns had fallen 
to £454m. This represented a high-low differential of 47%, even though Trinity Mirror’s 
portfolio of national newspapers had remained stable and its regional portfolio had grown 
through acquisitions. 
From the mid-2000s, each publisher intensified discourse on digital income. In 2012, 
GMG identified digital revenue as crucial to securing “a sustainable future for quality 
journalism”, but conceded that “media organisations across the world [were] struggling” to 
monetise online audiences (GMG 2012, 2). Despite the urgency in publishers’ discourse on 
digital transitions, it was difficult to gain a precise read on the revenue performance of digital 
news platforms. GMG failed to separate out digital revenues between 2002 and 2011. DMGT 
and Trinity Mirror tended to report headline figures for the digital revenues generated in their 
newspaper divisions, including returns from non-news businesses such as property, 
recruitment and transactional websites. But even when headline figures were inflated with 
non-news income, digital revenues remained a small proportion of each corporation’s overall 
revenues, significantly below print returns. 
In 2016, DMGT reported that Mail Online had generated record digital revenues of 
£93m. Despite years of accumulated declines, print revenues towered over this figure, at 
£534m. The same year, Trinity Mirror’s publishing division reported significantly improved 
digital income of £79m, against print revenues of £547m. In 2016, GMG returned a more 
balanced revenue profile (digital, £82m; print, £128m), but reported an operational loss. 
 
 
DMGT and Trinity Mirror remained operationally profitable before exceptional items 
across the study’s fifteen financial years, both at group and newspaper divisional level. 
DMGT’s group operating profit for 2016 was £277m, two thirds of which flowed from non-
news businesses. The same year, Trinity Mirror’s more print-centric portfolio generated an 
operating profit of £94m. GMG posted group operating losses from 2014 to 2016, with non-
news portfolio businesses supporting the group’s operational profitability in the years before 
this. Furthermore, the division hosting the Guardian posted an operational loss every year in 
the study’s timeline. Operational profitability of GMG’s overall print activities was 
maintained between 2002 and 2007 through regional newspaper returns.  
The publishers accumulated heavy debt loads prior to the financial crisis, with DMGT 
admitting it had entered the “downturn with too much debt” (DMGT 2009, 2). Like GMG, 
DMGT had borrowed to broaden its portfolio with non-news businesses. Following the 
financial crisis, each publisher adopted debt reduction strategies. GMG’s debt, which peaked 
at £462m in 2004, was pared to £20m by 2016. Trinity Mirror carried a debt of £349m in 
2008, but had reduced this to £31m by 2016. DGMT’s debt peaked at £1049m in 2009, but 
was compressed to £679m by 2016. 
Each year, the publishers highlighted efforts to diversify portfolio revenue streams, 
including from non-news sources. From 2006, DMGT outlined specific ambitions to lessen 
dependence on print income. It identified as a “high priority” expanding the digital activities 
and revenues of its newspaper operations (DMGT 2006, 18). Six years later, heralding the 
Mail Online’s international success, DMGT reaffirmed its strategy “to rebalance revenues 
from print towards digital” (DMGT 2012, 29). Also from the mid-2000s, Trinity Mirror 
signalled its intention to launch and acquire new digital businesses, with the goal of achieving 
“a more resilient mix of revenues” (Trinity Mirror 2009, 2).  
The discursive frame of rebalancing revenues emerged in GMG’s reports in 2012, 
after the corporation adopted a digital first policy. In seeking to grow digital income, 
alongside returns from its investment fund, GMG said its objective was to ensure that 
“sufficient resources” would be available in the short- and long-term to “meet the funding 
requirements of [its] journalism” (GMG 2010, 4). 
 
Print operations 
 
 
By the mid-2000s, each publisher was highlighting a structural decline in newspaper 
publishing. The print market’s deterioration accelerated after the financial crisis, intensifying 
a discursive challenge for the corporations: reassuring shareholders that managements could 
extend the profitable lifespan of waning print assets. DMGT affirmed that, “despite operating 
in a sector in long-term decline”, the print Mail would remain a “core business for many 
years” (DMGT 2010, 8). For each publisher, ensuring a commercially sustainable longer-
term future for print (and protecting shorter-term operating margins) depended on cost base 
reductions, especially in a market context where newspaper revenue growth was unlikely. 
DMGT demonstrated this when, during the financial crisis, it commended management for 
acting “fast to reduce our cost base, particularly in our newspaper divisions” (DMGT 2009, 
2). In paring cost bases, the publishers regularly announced redundancies. In 2010, DMGT 
said headcount at its regional division had sunk 50% since 2004 (DMGT 2010, 6). Four years 
later, it reported £20 million in restructuring costs, including “reduced headcount 
in...newspaper businesses” (DMGT 2014, 28). Trinity Mirror, too, targeted cost bases to 
protect print’s profitability. In 2009, it announced a 20% headcount reduction (1,700 staff) in 
regional operations, with further job losses in 2012 and 2013 (Trinity Mirror 2009, 2011, 
2013). GMG announced redundancies in 2007 and 2012. 
Managerial discourse on reducing cost bases tended to foreground commercial 
benefits without considering impacts on journalistic quality, as when DMGT highlighted in 
2014 that “the benefits of a more efficient cost base [were] expected to mitigate the impact on 
profitability” (DMGT 2014, 25). A partial exception to this came in 2010, when Trinity 
Mirror claimed that process innovation enabled the corporation to lower its publishing cost 
base and employee numbers “without detriment to quality” (Trinity Mirror 2010, 1). GMG, 
under the Scott Trust’s remit, was most likely to frame cost reductions as necessary to protect 
journalistic operations. 
Discourse on print’s decline tended to be balanced with management declarations to 
shareholders that print assets retained a healthy earnings capacity. DMGT positioned itself as 
“supporting” its print newspapers while “investing” in digital growth, adding assurances in 
2009 that “rumours of [print’s] death are much exaggerated” and in 2011 that print was “far 
from dead” (DMGT 2009, 3; 2011, 17). Trinity Mirror, which managed the largest print 
portfolio, refrained during the financial crisis from making explicit statements on print’s 
longer-term prospects. In 2014, however, it informed shareholders that notwithstanding 
“structural decline, print remains very important to the Group” (Trinity Mirror 2014, 3).  
Print’s weakened revenue performance increased pressure on the publishers to 
achieve scale and scope economies. This made regional holdings vulnerable when GMG and 
DMGT were restructuring their print portfolios. GMG sold its regional division to Trinity 
Mirror in 2010, citing the difficulties of holding a 4% market share in a sector where 
“success…increasingly depends on scale” (GMG 2010, 8). DMGT followed suit in 2012, 
selling its regional operation to Local World. In turn, Trinity Mirror acquired full ownership 
of Local World in 2015, seeking profits through consolidation of the local newspaper market. 
Among the reasons for newspapers’ diminished trading prospects was their reliance 
on advertising revenues, which, from 2006, DMGT and GMG acknowledged were migrating 
online. DMGT, in 2009, highlighted that significant volumes of advertising were “moving 
away from our traditional products to the internet” (DMGT 2009, 38). Two years later, 
DMGT included advertiser shifts to mobile among the corporation’s key “challenges” 
(DMGT 2011, 50). Advertiser shifts to digital were closely linked to changes in audiences’ 
relationships to print. DMGT identified “changing consumer behaviour” in 2011, 2012 and 
2013 as forcing the company to keep pace with “online adoption and social media usage” 
(DMGT 2013, 28). Consistently, from 2005, Trinity Mirror referenced the audiences’ 
changing relationships to print, although initially it linked this more to lifestyle shifts than to 
digital media.  
Each publisher sought to leverage the ‘trust’ associated with print mastheads to 
support digital transitions. Trinity Mirror and DMGT framed trust more in commodity than 
journalistic terms, foregrounding the revenue potential of extending their print newsbrands to 
digital platforms. DMGT illustrated this in 2007 when predicting that the group’s “strong 
trusted brands with premium content will ultimately prevail in the digital world” (DMGT 
2007, 10). Five years later, Trinity Mirror stated that the company’s expanding digital 
portfolio was harnessing the “trust of [its] print titles” (Trinity Mirror 2012, 4). GMG was 
most vocal about preserving its traditional journalistic values in the digital era, citing the 
Scott Trust’s obligation to safeguard the Guardian’s “editorial independence” (GMG 2009, 
5). 
 
Digital operations 
 
 
From 2006, the publishers placed a strong emphasis on digital transitions. Within two years, 
GMG was categorising itself as “no longer a predominantly print-based operation but a true 
multimedia organisation” (GMG 2008, 10). In 2012, GMG formally declared itself a digital 
first news organisation in recognition that “technological change had revolutionised the 
nature of journalism” (GMG 2012, 19). 
In 2007, DMGT described its initial “forays into new media” as “measured” (DMGT 
2007, 10). Just three years later, having escalated its digital investments, management viewed 
the corporation’s future as “largely digital” (DMGT 2010, 5). Accordingly, DMGT soon was 
classifying Mail Online among its “core digital businesses” (DMGT 2012, 29). 
Trinity Mirror began highlighting its digital investments from 2004, but five years 
would pass before the publisher discussed aspirations of a “multimedia future” (Trinity 
Mirror 2009, 1). Along these lines, the corporation flagged in 2015 its efforts to build “a 
digital business of scale”, echoing its print strategy of seeking scale and scope economies 
(Trinity Mirror 2015, 3). 
Also from the mid-2000s, the publishers placed greater stress on integrating print and 
digital editorial processes, and on securing flexible journalistic work practices. GMG was the 
only corporation to refer to trade union negotiations as it sought to implement new work 
practices for digital production. In 2008, it welcomed an internal agreement with the NUJ on 
cross-platform editorial production as “a critical step…to creating a 24/7 digital publishing 
operation” (GMG 2008, 11). Four years later, GMG was describing the Guardian’s 
publishing process as platform neutral.  
Similarly, from 2007, DMGT highlighted that its websites were “fully integrated into 
the editorial process of [its] newspaper operations” (DMGT 2007, 10). By 2014, it had 
adopted the term “platform agnostic” to describe a news production model that was 
“increasingly flexible in the fast-moving consumer market” (DMGT 2014, 23). Trinity 
Mirror, meanwhile, claimed a digital overhaul of its regional publishing from 2004. Five 
years later, its national newspapers were more firmly positioned within the cross-platform 
publishing strategy. The publisher noted that “significant investment in new editorial 
production systems” enabled editorial teams to produce and publish content “simultaneously 
across multiple media channels” including mobile (Trinity Mirror 2009, 26). 
Digital platforms enabled the publishers to reach beyond their traditional print 
audiences. GMG framed digital as an opportunity to extend the Guardian’s journalism to an 
international audience, with ambitions “to become the world’s leading liberal voice” (GMG 
2008, 11). DMGT stressed the commercial importance of investing in “digital assets that are 
increasingly interactive and international in audience appeal” (DMGT 2013, 20). Trinity 
Mirror, too, emphasised potential commercial benefits: in particular, how its digital brands 
were attracting a younger audience “at the higher end of the socioeconomic scale than [its] 
traditional newspaper audiences” (Trinity Mirror 2011, 9). 
Each publisher faced challenges in translating digital audience reach into revenues. 
They consistently highlighted the opportunities their digital activities offered to advertisers. 
In 2006, DMGT informed shareholders that it had “developed an internet strategy for each of 
[its] main segments of advertising revenue” (DMGT 2006, 13). Four years later, it described 
the advertising-funded Mail Online as a “core engine for [revenue] growth” (DMGT 2010, 
6).  
In 2010, GMG considered introducing a paywall to the Guardian website, but 
concluded that such a move would not be “commercially or editorially attractive” (GMG 
2011, 12). In 2014, GMG launched a membership scheme whereby users could make 
voluntary financial contributions to the Guardian. 
Trinity Mirror was emphasising digital advertising’s revenue potential as early as 
2003. Later, it underscored to shareholders the importance of selling advertisers an overall 
print/digital audience reach to “monetise this previously untapped [digital] audience” (Trinity 
Mirror 2007, 16).   
 
Discussion 
 
The annual reports reflected the year-on-year continuities and shifts in the publishers’ 
strategies, organisational structures, operational processes, investment priorities, resource 
allocations, product and business portfolios, and measures to achieve profitable news 
production. Recognition of news’s societal value, as a positive externality (McChesney 2013; 
Baker 2007), was weakly embedded in the reports (GMG partially excepted), as was the role 
of the corporations as operational contexts for journalism’s values paradigm.  
The low-level encoding by managements of discourse on journalism’s watchdog and 
informed-citizenry roles could be interpreted as reflecting the normative value of editorial 
independence within corporate frameworks. However, even in the absence of direct editorial 
interventions, managerial decisions on resourcing remain a crucial determinant of 
institutional capacity to produce public interest news and sustain journalism’s values 
paradigm. Journalistic autonomy, range, depth and quality can be affected significantly by the 
organisational structures, production processes, productivity expectations, editorial staffing 
levels and budgets that managements impose in the pursuit of commercial sustainability and 
profitability. 
In this vein, DMGT and Trinity Mirror justified retaining news products within their 
portfolios predominantly on commercial grounds (serving audiences positioned as 
consumers). Managerial discourse focused on news operations’ capacities to sustain 
profitability amid print declines and digital transitions. In both corporations, news traded as 
an operationally profitable commodity throughout the study’s timeframe, with unprofitable 
newspapers either being closed or sold (without managerial discourse considering the 
implications for affected readerships of news service loss). The overriding requirement that 
news operations be net contributors to group operating profits had significant consequences 
for the resourcing of journalism, with recurring narratives in both corporations’ reports on 
cost cutting, process efficiencies and headcount reductions. 
GMG, through the Scott Trust, justified the Guardian’s position in its portfolio on 
public interest rather than commercial grounds. The division hosting the Guardian 
newspaper/website returned operational losses every year in the study’s timeframe, which 
GMG sustained through profits from wider portfolio activities. However, GMG’s other news 
products, such as local newspapers, fell outside the Scott Trust’s remit, and on a commodity 
basis were required to be net contributors to the corporation’s balance sheet. GMG’s 
strategies to maintain operational profits at its regional division were similar to DMGT’s and 
Trinity Mirror’s, and included cost cutting, process efficiencies, headcount reductions and 
newspaper closures. GMG sold its regional division when it ceased to be a reliable generator 
of operational profits. The ruthlessness with which the three publishers closed unprofitable 
regional newspapers was consistent with the managerial logic of positioning news audiences 
more as consumers than citizens: the corporations considered themselves to bear no ongoing 
responsibility to provide a (news) service to communities if it was not profitable to do so. 
In reshaping their structures and processes amid a rapidly changing media landscape, 
the publishers adopted portfolio approaches to gain institutional and commercial “renewal” 
(Doyle 2013b, 1). Portfolio restructuring across the fifteen years, and the underpinning shifts 
in resource allocations, provided indicators of the relative priority the corporations attached 
to news operations. To safeguard corporate profitability and shareholder value, DMGT’s 
priorities shifted not only from print to digital but also from news to non-news businesses. 
News (print publishing) remained Trinity Mirror’s core business throughout the timeline, 
with managerial strategies focused on extending print’s profitable life. 
GMG’s portfolio restructuring was geared to sustaining the Guardian, and provided 
the only instance of portfolio profits being used to absorb news operation losses. In DMGT 
and Trinity Mirror, the main evidence of portfolio subsidisation was of print activities 
resourcing the development of, and “brand transference” (Picard 2005, 14) to, digital 
products. Managerial discourse framed it as a strategy to protect the future commercial 
sustainability and profitability of news production.  
Each publisher identified advertising as its core source of digital income, and 
discursively amplified its importance from the mid-2000s. But in no case was digital income 
sufficient to fund a news operation without continued revenue support from print or other 
portfolio activities. The annual reports tended not to consider the specific implications for 
news publishers of third-party ad networks and advertising models that followed users across 
websites and apps. Neither did the corporations reveal the fees that such networks had 
generated on their digital properties. A further indicator of news’s diminished commodity 
value online was that the publishers raised much of their digital revenues not on news-
platforms but on ancillary property, recruitment and consumer websites.  
The annual reports gave a relatively clear view of where revenues had been generated 
within the corporations, but were opaque in detailing how monies circulated internally. This 
created difficulties when seeking to track resource allocations and shifts as the corporations 
reshaped their portfolios. Often, the range of resource allocations underpinning their digital 
transitions had to be gauged from managerial discourse on operational performances, 
principal business activities, investment strategies, and targets for cost savings. Similarly, the 
reports discursively indicated the complexity of organisational and managerial learning 
around new business models, technological systems, organisational structures, and production 
processes. Each publisher increasingly prioritised digital investment and innovation, with 
print-related innovation focused on cost savings through process efficiencies in production, 
printing and distribution. Some print functions were rendered obsolete or marginal in the 
corporations’ digital shifts, or, with new content management systems, required fewer 
journalists. As Doyle (2015) has highlighted, such systems have enabled publishers to 
increase the volume (if not necessarily the diversity and quality) of news content output, even 
after editorial budget and staff cuts. 
However, when promoting the economic efficiencies of new systems, the reports 
ignored the institutional loss of journalistic tacit knowledge during headcount reductions: the 
contacts, judgement and professional experience that journalists require to produce high-
quality news. Neither did managerial discourse on commercial sustainability consider the 
implications of headcount reductions for the publishers’ institutional capacity to host and 
support journalism’s values paradigm and positive externalities. 
Notwithstanding investments in digital technologies and jobs, and the achievement of 
lower operating cost bases, the publishers were from the mid-2000s running news operations 
within tighter institutional financial parameters. During and after the global financial crisis, 
each corporation returned lower group and news-related revenues, used available monies to 
pay down debt, and was either less inclined or less able to borrow to fund digital transitions. 
The corporations (particularly GMG and Trinity Mirror) were, in overall revenue terms, 
smaller institutional entities in 2016 than in 2002. The shrinkage was troubling when weighed 
against traditional arguments that a news organisation’s financial independence and resources 
protect public interest journalism in a market-based system. 
The annual reports revealed that certain management behaviours and operational 
strategies were entrenched across the fifteen year timeframe, even though the wider media 
environment was fast changing. Managements in DMGT and Trinity Mirror (and GMG for 
regional news) evaluated success on their ability to maintain short-term print operating 
margins, with, discursively, a lesser emphasis on maintaining journalistic quality. In seeking 
to extend print’s profitable life, the publishers were drawing largely on strategies that 
newspaper corporations implemented in the 1960s to increase profits following public 
floatation: cost cutting, more efficient production technologies, raised cover prices, and 
(particularly for Trinity Mirror) scale and scope economies. The staleness of such strategies 
might be expected of print as a mature, declining product. But there was a similar lack of 
agility among the publishers in developing digital strategies and business models to support 
news production, which across the study’s timeline remained anchored to advertising (with 
the Guardian’s membership scheme a partial exception). 
 
Concluding comments 
 
Across fifteen financial years, the publishers returned meagre evidence that the news they 
distributed across digital platforms could achieve commercial sustainability while upholding 
its public interest value. Further, the reports highlighted that as the publishers’ hold on 
traditional monopoly distribution structures were breaking down, so too were their 
relationships with advertisers who were prioritising new digital platforms to reach consumers. 
 With the exception of GMG for the Guardian, the reports gave little attention to how 
the publishers were custodians of and operational contexts to journalism’s values paradigm. 
Neither did they consider how journalistic values and norms were being protected within 
digital transition strategies and the reshaping of journalistic roles and practices. The DMGT 
and Trinity Mirror reports, along with GMG’s for regional news, suggested that serving as 
institutional hosts to journalism’s values paradigm was a secondary concern when the 
corporations were seeking business models and processes to underpin operationally profitable 
news production in an increasingly digital market. 
The relative priority the publishers attached to their news operations in 
commodity/public interest terms could be gauged from group level responses to shifting 
market conditions and technological contexts. DMGT’s and Trinity Mirror’s portfolio 
strategies were aimed at protecting the corporations’ profitability and shareholder value. 
GMG’s portfolio strategy was geared to preserving the Guardian’s public interest journalism. 
But even this instance of journalism’s positive externalities being prioritised was contingent 
on market forces, as the Guardian’s long-term sustainability depended, largely, on investment 
fund returns outstripping GMG’s operational losses. 
The study highlighted a consistent market failure in supporting public interest 
journalism. News operations that prioritised news’s commodity value (DMGT, Trinity 
Mirror, GMG’s regional division) remained operationally profitable primarily through 
significant cost cutting, tightening the resource parameters for news production. The 
publishers embodied three different conceptions of public interest journalism and three 
portfolio approaches. Nevertheless, they exhibited few signs of a market solution to the 
robust resourcing of public interest journalism. GMG (Scott Trust) excepted, neither did 
managerial discourse attach a high priority to sustaining journalism’s values paradigm in 
corporate contexts where news-related revenues were falling. Arguably, the digital era has 
eroded the traditional market value of newspaper publishers being seen as authoritative 
disseminators of news. This study suggests it may also be enfeebling corporations’ 
managerial and commercial justifications for acting as operational contexts to journalism’s 
values paradigm. 
When viewed through the lens of journalism’s positive externalities, the societal 
ramifications of this are significant. Despite years of retrenchment, legacy newspaper 
publishers have remained the UK’s lynchpin of journalistic employment, investment and 
original news output – even when the presence of the BBC is considered  (Kleis-Nielsen 
2016; Levy and Kleis-Nielsen 2010). This echoes trends internationally. Actors in newer 
media sectors, including broadcasting and online services, have tended to invest less in news 
than in other forms of content competing for audiences’ attention, such as entertainment, 
sports and social networking (Kleis-Nielsen 2016; Levy and Kleis-Nielsen 2010). Similarly, 
online developments would appear to be contradicting “celebrant claims” that new digital 
players would displace traditional providers in underwriting commercial journalism’s 
commitment to securing transparency and accountability in democratic societies (Hardy 
2017, 2). In that context, it remains essential to continue to direct scholarly attention to 
examining how legacy publishers are managing print’s decline, as well as to evaluating the 
digital news infrastructures, models and strategies that are emerging within their corporate 
frameworks.  
Analysing corporate annual reports tilts the discussion towards ownership, managerial 
decisions and actions, and advertising as a means of funding news production. Ownership 
and advertising sit among a wider range of economic, political, regulatory, technological, 
social and cultural factors that contribute to the marketisation of news (Hardy 2010). Non-
profit, alternative, independent and public service media also are sources of news, beyond the 
corporate for-profit model. Nevertheless, institutionally resourced commercial journalism 
remains crucial in the digital age. How this is sustained and resourced within corporate 
frameworks is a key concern when production structures and funding models are less certain. 
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